Quintilian on Humor (I)

Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria (ca. 93 A.D.) is believed the second systematic work (following Cicero’s De Oratore, of course) which deals with humor. Chapter 1 in Book VI is dedicated to its related reasoning and analysis.

He speaks of the function of humor in court:

“[The talent of laughter-raising] dispels the graver emotions of the judge by exciting his laughter, frequently diverts his attention from the facts of the case, and sometimes even refreshes him and revives him when he has begun to be bored or wearied by the case”

--Insitutio Oratoria, VI, iii, 1

In his understanding, humor is an emotion, and yet the cause of humor (or, funny effect) is uncertain. There, however, are several possible sources, “such as words or actions that are witty, or which reveal folly, anger, or fear” (Figueroa-Dorrego & Larkin-Galiñanes 40-41).

Quintilian asserts that humor “depends mainly on nature and opportunity” (Institutio Oratoria, VI, iii, 11). By “nature,” he refers to a born sense of humor; by “opportunity,” an amusing situation. Some people are born with a quicker mind or keener sense to raise laughter. Some situations are more inclined to offer chances of repartees. In everyday life, as noticed, a combination of the two usually promises a convivial gathering or social success.

In his discussion that humor is to be conformed to gravitas (following Cicero’s footsteps), Quintilian defines six terms related to wit:

1.      Urbanitas: “language with a smack of the city in its words, accent and idioms, and further suggests a certain tincture of learning derived from associating with well-educated men; in a word, it represents the opposite of rusticity” (17).

2.      Venustus: “that which is said with grace and charm” (18).

3.      Salsus: “wit about which there is nothing insipid, wit, that is to say, which serves as a simple seasoning of language, […], with the result that it stimulates our taste and saves a speech from becoming tedious” (19; he warns that salty wit like salty food should not be served too much.).

4.      Facetus: “a certain grace and polished elegance” (20).

5.      Iocus: “usually taken to mean the opposite of seriousness. This view is, however, somewhat too narrow. For to feign, to terrify, or to promise, are all at times forms of jesting” (21).

6.      Dicacitas: “especially applied to the language of banter, which is a humorous form of attack” (21).